Freddo v. State

NAME:
Freddo v. State, 127 Tenn. 376 (1913)

FACTS:
· π was 19 at the time of the incident and had been an orphan since he was 4. Later he lived in the family of a Nashville lady who raised him to be morally well trained (a quiet, peaceable, high-minded young man of a somewhat introverted disposition).
· Due, perhaps, to the loss of his mother at infancy and to his gratitude of his foster mother, he respected women beyond the average young man and detested language that degraded womanhood
· Deceased was part of a group that used obscene language, specifically the term “son of a bitch.” Also, deceased is shown to have been habitually foul-mouthed, overbearing, and “nagging and tormenting” in language, and at times in conduct.
· π requested on several occasions that the deceased desist using the term “son-of-a-bitch” especially when talking to him.
· Deceased, of learning that someone spilled oil on his toolbox, assumed it was π and called him a “son of a bitch”
· π, after hearing this, seized a steel bar, swung and struck deceased on the side of his head killing him shortly after arriving at the hospital.

PROCEDURE:
π was indicted in the criminal court of Davidson County for the crime of murder in the first degree and was found guilty of murder in the second degree. His sentence was fixed at 10 years imprisonment. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and appealed to this court for the errors assigned.

ISSUE:
Did the facts warrant a verdict of guilty of a crime greater than voluntary manslaughter?

HOLDING:
YES. While π’s act was committed under the impulse of sudden heat of passion, it did not suffice to reduce the grade of crime from murder 2 to voluntary manslaughter because the provocation in which elicited the act was not such that an average reasonable man would commit the same act

REASONING:
· The law tests the adequacy of the provocation based on the mind of an ordinarily constituted person of fair average mind and disposition.
· The rule in this state regards no language, no matter how violent or offensive, as sufficient provocation for taking life.
· It was apparent to the court, based on the facts, that the blow was struck by π in error in sudden anger and passion, aroused by the repeated use of the term “son of a bitch” and in a tone that made it offensive.
· Proof also indicates that pursuant to the warnings and prior to the murder, the two had been on amicable, but not familiar, terms.

DISPOSITION:
Affirmed. The court recommended to the Governor of the state that his sentence be altered to such punishment, in the light of the record and opinion, to be proper. The court allowed 10 days from the execution of the sentence for application.

DISSENT:
None

EVALUATION:
Provocation is defined as something, such as words, that affects a person’s reason and self-control. The question here is whether or not the use of the term “son of a bitch” would provoke a reasonable person to commit the same act. The jury, supported by the court, properly held that, while the π had continually requested that the deceased desist using the term, such language interpreted by a reasonable person would not warrant the killing of a man.

SYNTHESIS:
In order for a conviction of murder 2 to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter, the act must not only have been done under the impulse of the sudden heat of passion but the provocation of the act must be such that a reasonable person under the same circumstances would have acted the same way. The court has held that no words, regardless of how violent or offensive, warrant the killing of a man.