NAME:
Lopez v. Winchell’s Donut House, 126 Ill. App. 3d 46, 1984
FACTS:
· π was a clerk at Δ donut shop
· π was called at her house and requested that she come to the shop. When she arrived Cesario and Bell took her into the back office, closed and locked the door behind her.
· Cesario and Bell accused her of stealing from the cash draw
· π testified that she at no time during the interrogation feared for her safety; at no time refused to answer any question; and there was never a point that she said “I want to leave” and was prevented from doing so.
PROCEDURE:
Trial court entered summary judgment for Δ; π appeals.
ISSUE:
Did the court err by granting Δ’s motion for summary judgment as there exists a genuine issue of material fact?
HOLDING:
The trial court properly granted Δ’s motion for summary judgment, as there exists no question of material fact.
REASONING:
· False imprisonment is defined as an unlawful restraint of an individual’s personal liberty or freedom of locomotion.
· Ways in which an actor may bring about the confinement required as an element of false imprisonment: (1) actual or apparent physical barriers; (2) overpowering physical force, (3) threats of physical force; (4) other duress; and (5) asserted legal authority. –Rest 2d. of Torts secs. 38-41.
· “Moral pressure, as where the π remains with the defendant to clear himself of suspicion of theft *** is not enough; nor, as in the case of assault, are threats for the future ***.” –Prosser, Torts sec. 11, at 45.
· In the tort of false imprisonment, it is not enough for the π to have felt “compelled” to remain in the baking room in order to protect her reputation.
· In this case, no evidence that π yielded to constraint of a threat, express or implied, or to physical force of any kind.
· No evidence existed that π accompanied Cesario against her will, and therefore, court could not say that she was imprisoned or unlawfully detained by Δ’s employees.
DISPOSITION:
Summary Judgment affirmed
DISSENT:
None
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