McCann v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 210 F. 3d 51

NAME:

McCann v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 210 F. 3d 51

FACTS:
· π’s shopping at Δ’s store
· When leaving, π’s were prevented from leaving the store by two employees of the Δ who stepped in front of the shopping cart, blocking their path to exit and actually placing their hand on the cart, stating that the police were on their way.
· π’s son was mistaken for the son of a different family who had been caught shoplifting two weeks before.
· π’s were detained near the front of the store and waited for the police, which later turned out to be a security guard who stated that they had the wrong boy.

PROCEDURE:

Jury awarded the McCanns $20,000 in Compensatory damages. Wal-Mart appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the jury, by the facts presented, would conclude that the π was falsely imprisoned by the Δ?

HOLDING:

The court concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that Δ’s employees intended to “confine” the π’s “within boundaries fixed by” Δ, that the employees’ acts did result in such a confinement, and that the π were conscious of the confinement.

REASONING:
· False Imprisonment: conduct by the actor which is intended to, and does in fact, “confine” another “within boundaries fixed by the actor” where, in addition, the victim is either “conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.” –Restatement 2d., Torts §35
· Physical barriers or physical force, as well as mere threats of physical force can suffice as “confinement”
· Threats of “confinement” may be implicit as well as explicit, and can also be based on a false assertion of legal authority to confine. –Restatement, Supra, § 41
· Confinement may occur by other unspecified means of “duress.” Id. § 40A.
· The mere threat of physical force, or a claim of lawful authority to restrain, as enough to satisfy the confinement requirement for false imprisonment.
· The directions to the π, the reference to the police, and the continued presence of the Δ’s employees…were enough to induce reasonable people to believe either that they would be restrained physically if they sought to leave, or that the store was claiming lawful authority to confine them until the police arrived, or both.

DISPOSITION:

Affirmed

DISSENT:

None

Lopez v. Winchell’s Donut House, 126 Ill. App. 3d 46, 1984

NAME:

Lopez v. Winchell’s Donut House, 126 Ill. App. 3d 46, 1984

FACTS:
· π was a clerk at Δ donut shop
· π was called at her house and requested that she come to the shop. When she arrived Cesario and Bell took her into the back office, closed and locked the door behind her.
· Cesario and Bell accused her of stealing from the cash draw
· π testified that she at no time during the interrogation feared for her safety; at no time refused to answer any question; and there was never a point that she said “I want to leave” and was prevented from doing so.

PROCEDURE:

Trial court entered summary judgment for Δ; π appeals.

ISSUE:

Did the court err by granting Δ’s motion for summary judgment as there exists a genuine issue of material fact?

HOLDING:

The trial court properly granted Δ’s motion for summary judgment, as there exists no question of material fact.

REASONING:
· False imprisonment is defined as an unlawful restraint of an individual’s personal liberty or freedom of locomotion.
· Ways in which an actor may bring about the confinement required as an element of false imprisonment: (1) actual or apparent physical barriers; (2) overpowering physical force, (3) threats of physical force; (4) other duress; and (5) asserted legal authority. –Rest 2d. of Torts secs. 38-41.
· “Moral pressure, as where the π remains with the defendant to clear himself of suspicion of theft *** is not enough; nor, as in the case of assault, are threats for the future ***.” –Prosser, Torts sec. 11, at 45.
· In the tort of false imprisonment, it is not enough for the π to have felt “compelled” to remain in the baking room in order to protect her reputation.
· In this case, no evidence that π yielded to constraint of a threat, express or implied, or to physical force of any kind.
· No evidence existed that π accompanied Cesario against her will, and therefore, court could not say that she was imprisoned or unlawfully detained by Δ’s employees.

DISPOSITION:

Summary Judgment affirmed

DISSENT:

None

Dupler v. Seubert, 69 Wis. 2d 373, (1975)

NAME:

Dupler v. Seubert, 69 Wis. 2d 373, (1975)

FACTS:
· π, a CSR at a telephone company was asked by Δ to come to Peterson’s office, and after the door was closed, was given the option of either resigning or be fired
· π refused to resign
· At 5PM π attempted to leave (feeling sick) but Peterson told her to sit down in “a very loud harsh voice,” and when she got up to leave (about to vomit) Δ stood in front of the door.
· After returning from the bathroom Peterson said “Sit down. I’m still your boss. I’m not through with you,” even though she was not being paid after 5PM and it was well after 5PM.
· At 6PM she was finally permitted to leave after Δ’s failed to convince her to resign

PROCEDURE:

The jury found that both Δ’s falsely imprisoned π and fixed her damages at $7,500.

ISSUE:

Is the jury’s verdict, finding that π was falsely imprisoned, supported by the evidence?

HOLDING:

The record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that π was intentionally confined, against her will, by an implied threat of actual physical restraint. The jury could properly find that Δ’s falsely imprisoned π by compelling her to remain in Peterson’s office against her will after 5PM.

REASONING:
· The essence of false imprisonment is the intentional, unlawful, and unconsented restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another
· Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 35: “False Imprisonment (1) An actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment if (a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within the boundaries fixed by the actor, and (b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.
· Sec. 39 and 40: the confinement may be caused by physical force or the threat of physical force and the threat may either be express, or inferred from the persons conduct
· Prosser: “Character of Δ Act – The restraint may be by means of physical barriers, or by threats of force which intimidate the π into compliance with orders…sufficient that he submits to an apprehension of force reasonably to be understood from the conduct of the Δ…gives rise to question of fact…and normally are for the jury.”

DISPOSITION:

Order affirmed; judgment modified with new trial ordered on the issue of damages unless, w/in twenty days of remittitur, π elects to accept judgment for $1,000 and as modified , affirmed.

DISSENT:

None